Scholars analysing party system structures have generally followed two approaches. The 'institutional' approach emphasizes the role of electoral laws, while the 'sociological' approach highlights the effect of socioeconomic heterogeneity. Recently, evidence based on cross-country data indicated that a high level of fragmentation requires both a permissive electoral system and substantial socio-economic heterogeneity. As electoral rules have their main impact at the level of the constituency, using country-level data may not be ideal, however. Moreover, previous results appear to be driven by the inclusion of single-member district states. Both these caveats are addressed in this article. Based on a sample of Belgian municipal elections over the period 1982-2000, I show that the model incorporating an interaction between heterogeneity and district magnitude significantly outperforms specifications that disregard the interaction effect (a) at the constituency level and (b) in (mediumsize) multi-member districts.
Introduction
The question about what shapes the party system has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. Most basically, two approaches have been followed to answer it. The 'institutional' approach emphasizes the role of electoral laws (cf. Duverger, 1954) , while the 'sociological' approach highlights the effect of socio-economic differences or 'cleavages' in the population (cf. Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) . These elements have generally been considered to be more or less isolated from one another. However, recently, a number of scholars have put forward the view that both elements may well interact with one another (Amorim-Neto and Cox, 1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994) . The argument is that 'a polity will have many parties only if it both has many cleavages and has a permissive enough electoral system' (AmorimNeto and Cox, 1997: 155, emphasis in original) . Cross-country evidence provided in these studies is generally supportive of this interactive model.
The present article makes use of Belgian data at the municipality level from municipal elections over the period [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] . This allows us to extend the findings of previous studies in three important respects. Firstly, using constituency-level data has the advantage of testing the effect of electoral rules at the level where these effects actually play (without a need to average variables over districts within a country). In this choice, we follow the specific recommendation of Amorim-Neto and Cox (1997) (see also Taagepera and Shugart, 1989; Cox and Shugart, 1991) . Secondly, and importantly from an econometric point of view, our data do not suffer from possible endogeneity problems faced in country-level data. This is because district magnitude is determined by federal law in Belgium and thus is beyond the control of local politicians. Finally, Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994: 121) conclude that 'much of the evidence in favor of an interactive model does derive from the character of single-member district states'. Our analysis confronts this finding by focusing only on multi-member districts (with 7 to 55 seats).
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The next section presents an overview of the literature on party systems. The data, methodology and empirical analysis are recorded in the following section, while the main conclusions are summarized in the final section.
Review of the Literature
One of the classic questions in political science contemplates the determinants of the number of parties. Answers to this question can be grouped under two main approaches: one institutional and one sociological (Amorim-Neto and Cox, 1997) . The first emphasizes the role of electoral laws, while the latter concentrates on the number of social cleavages.
The 'institutionalist' approach is often associated with Duverger (1954) . Though he was not the first to claim a relation between the number of parties and electoral rules (see Riker, 1982) , he was the first to give this relationship a 'law-like' status. More precisely, Duverger (1954) stated that political systems based on majority rule tended towards two-party systems, while Proportional Representation (PR) tended to maintain multiparty systems. In the subsequent literature, these relations came to be known as Duverger's 'Law' and 'Hypothesis', respectively. More generally, one could argue that the number of parties is positively related with the proportionality of the electoral system. This relation operates through two channels (Duverger, 1954; Rae, 1967) . Firstly, there is a purely mechanical or proximal effect caused by the translation of votes into seats. A less proportional translation makes it harder for smaller parties to obtain seats. This restricts the number of parties in parliament (though not directly the number of electoral parties). Foreseeing the mechanical effects of the electoral system, voters, party elites and party financiers could change their behavior. Unwilling to waste votes and/or resources on parties that have no reliable chance of gaining representation, these groups may shift support to the larger parties in non-proportional systems. Over time, these psychological or distal factors lead to the disappearance of smaller parties, hence limiting the extent of electoral competition in non-proportional systems.
The critical determinant of the number of parties brought forward by the institutionalist approach is district magnitude (Rae, 1967; Sartori, 1968; Taagepera and Shugart, 1993) . A larger district magnitude, that is, a higher number of legislative seats allocated in the district, is favourable to a higher number of parties, ceteris paribus. The reason is that the district magnitude positively influences the system's proportionality, at least when a system of PR is used (Farrell, 2001; Lijphart, 1999) .
Proponents of the 'sociological' approach downplay the effect of electoral systems on the number of parties. This is based on the observation that many countries had more than two parties before a system of proportional representation was introduced. Hence, 'any theory making the electoral system the fundamental causal factor in the development of party systems cannot be sustained' (Bogdanor, 1983: 254) . Rather, in this sociological approach, the fragmentation of the party system is dependent on the number of socio-economic cleavages in the electorate (Karvonen and Kuhnle, 2002; Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) . These cleavages refer to criteria by which the population can be divided into separate groups, e.g. religioussecular, rich-poor, conservative-progressive, and so on. In other words, 'social segmentation results in multipartism' (Lane and Ersson, 1987: 154) . The reason for this relation is that the number of parties required to express all dimensions of political conflict in a society is higher when the amount of conflicting cleavage dimensions increases (Lijphart, 1999) .
There thus exist two theoretical explanations for the level of party system fragmentation. And so far, scholars have looked at these as being of a different order. For example, empirical research by Rae and Taylor (1970) and Lane and Ersson (1987) on the basis of cross-country data and by Jones (1997) on district-level data lends support for the hypothesis that socio-economic heterogeneity is significantly related to party system fragmentation. Studies by Shugart (1985) and Blais and Carty (1991) , on the other hand, find that the number of parties is lower under plurality /majority voting and, in PR systems, when the district magnitude is lower. In each of these studies, however, there is a strict focus on one or both theoretical explanations, and no variables important to the rival model are included.
Recently, this divide in the literature has been abridged. A number of scholars have argued that both explanations might not be mutually exclusive and that there may well be an interaction effect between population heterogeneity and electoral laws (e.g. Amorim-Neto and Cox, 1997; Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994; Powell, 1982) . The theoretical reason to incorporate interaction effects between electoral laws and population heterogeneity stems from the fact that a very homogeneous society is unlikely to sustain many parties, even when PR is used. Also, in a very heterogeneous society, 'multipartyism will be likely unless the electoral and constitutional system encourages consolidation' (Powell, 1982: 84) . High district magnitude will thus not lead to a large number of parties in the absence of a significant level of social diversity, and vice versa. 1 Evidence in support of this view has been brought forward. Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) , for example, study elections in European countries between 1918 and 1990 and include an interaction term between the electoral system variable (i.e. district magnitude) and heterogeneity. Though they try measures for religious and linguistic heterogeneity, the main focus is on a measure for ethnic heterogeneity (the findings, however, are roughly comparable). The results show that 'district magnitude is not merely an important determinant of the number of parties (. . .), but that it can offset the tendency of parties to multiply in heterogeneous societies' (Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994: 100) . 2 This finding of a significant interaction effect, however, only holds when including single-member district systems. When restricting the model to countries with PR systems (and thus, by definition, multi-member districts), no significant interaction effect is uncovered. Amorim-Neto and Cox (1997) and Cox (1997) extend the dataset used by Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) to include Third World countries. They too find a strongly significant interaction effect between electoral system variables and ethnic heterogeneity. 3 Taagepera (1999) -using a dataset of 22 'stable regimes' -likewise finds that including interactions between district magnitude and the number of relevant issue dimensions offers a marked improvement of the model's explanatory power compared to including these variables separately. Filippov et al. (1999) and Mozaffar et al. (2003) report similar results for datasets consisting of Eastern and Central European countries and African emerging democracies, respectively. Interestingly, Jones (2004) shows that these results may not hold when explaining the extent of candidate competition in presidential (rather than legislative) elections. In fact, he finds that a pure institutional model performs at least as well as an interactive model for presidential elections in 50 democracies.
The literature, though limited in size, appears supportive of significant interaction effects between (ethnic) heterogeneity and district magnitudeat least in legislative elections. However, in our view, three important caveats might cast some doubt on this conclusion. Firstly, as mentioned above, the result appears to be driven by single-member district states. Secondly, the district magnitude in each of these studies may be politically determined in order to produce certain desirable effects with respect to minority representation. In other words, and as already recognized by Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) , district magnitude is likely to be an endogenous variable. This constitutes a serious methodological problem and implies the possibility of biased estimation results. Finally, the key electoral factors (e.g. district magnitude) as well as population heterogeneity can vary widely within a given nation. It is not clear to what extent the averaging of these variables over the various districts to obtain one observation per country affects the results. Hence, Amorim-Neto and Cox (1997: 168) suggest that 'it may be fruitful in further investigations of the interaction effect (. . .) to use constituency-level electoral returns and constituency-level indicators of social diversity'.
Recently, three studies have tested for the effect of socio-economic heterogeneity as well as district magnitude (or the 'effective threshold') using constituency-level data from multi-member districts -addressing two of the three caveats mentioned above. 4 Vatter (2003) regards elections for the 24 Swiss cantonal parliaments (with 49 to 200 members) and finds a significant interaction between religious heterogeneity and the effective threshold. Lago Penas (2004) reveals a significant interaction effect between the effective threshold and the strength of 'regional identity' in an analysis of 17 Spanish Autonomous Community parliaments (with 40 to 100 members). Neither study, however, verifies whether this still holds after controlling for the independent effects of electoral rules and population heterogeneity -and thereby precludes an assessment of whether the interaction effect adds explanatory power to such a model. Both nonetheless conclude the additive model to outperform the interactive model. Vander Weyden (2004) -studying Romanian senatorial elections where 2 to 5 members are elected per district -shows a statistically significant interaction effect between district magnitude and both religious and ethnic heterogeneity (even after controlling for their independent effects). He concludes that 'the existence of an interaction effect can be generalized beyond single-member districts' (Vander Weyden, 2004: 23, own translation) .
Empirical Analysis

Data
Our empirical work is based on data from 587 Belgian municipalities and four municipal elections (1982, 1988, 1994, 2000) . 5 This makes it the first analysis of the elements affecting fragmentation at this level of government. Moreover, our dataset has a number of appealing characteristics that permit us to address all three caveats mentioned in the previous section. For one, we clearly address the issue of moving towards constituency-level data in electoral studies (Amorim-Neto and Cox, 1997; Cox and Shugart, 1991; Taagepera and Shugart, 1989) . Moreover, all Belgian municipalities use the same electoral system (i.e. highest average Imperiali -without legal thresholds). One institutional factor that does differ across municipalities is the district magnitude. Hence, we can estimate the effect of differences in the district magnitude while controlling for all other characteristics of the electoral system. This is important because disregarding differences in these institutional factors can cause the regression estimates to be biased (Benoit, 2001) . And last, but certainly not least, district magnitudes in Belgian municipalities are determined by federal law and are thus not dependent on decisions taken by local politicians. 6 This is crucial, as it implies that these data are exogenous. Hence, we address the problem of endogeneity of district magnitude encountered in all previous studies. 7 A possible argument against using municipal election data is the 'nationalization' of local politics. We agree that this is also the case in Belgium. Local elections tend to have a high degree of 'national interest' and politicians linked to 'national' parties carry away more than 75 percent of the seats in the local council over the period 1976-94 (see Reynaert, 2000) . It is, however, important to observe that this does not invalidate the idea that the number of parties competing in local elections -be they local parties or divisions of national parties -can be regarded as a function of the size of the local playing field (i.e. the number of seats) and the socio-economic differences in the population. Just as at other levels of government, parties only compete at the local level when they believe there is a market for them. Indeed, 'different localities will have different interests and weigh issues differently' (Benoit, 2001: 205) allowing a given party to arise in some municipalities, while not in others. This notion is corroborated by the observation that 'national' parties do not present a list of candidates in every municipality during municipal elections (Deschouwer, 1996) .
Given certain eligibility requirements (e.g. no criminal convictions), all inhabitants of the municipality above age 18 can stand for election on the local council. Presenting a list in the municipal elections is, moreover, fairly easy. It only requires presentation of the proposed list four weeks prior to the elections accompanied by a limited number of signatures (of individuals eligible to vote in the municipality) in support of the candidacies. The number of signatures depends on the size of the municipality and varies between 5 and 100. The party's list should contain at least one candidate with a maximum equal to the number of seats to be distributed.
Summary statistics for the variables in our model are provided in Table  1 . The uppermost row corresponds to our main dependent variable: the number of electoral parties (NoP). This is obtained by counting the number of parties that obtained at least one vote in the election. On average, about 5 parties participate in each of the elections in our sample -with a minimum at 2 and a maximum at 18. We prefer this simple count as our dependent variable to the 'effective' number of parties. 8 The reason is that the relevant decision for the party is to enter the electoral competition. This is a priori unrelated to its score in those elections. Hence, the actual number of parties in the election might be the proper measure to use (for a similar discussion, see Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994: 103-4) . For comparison, we also report the results with the 'effective' number of parties as dependent variable.
The remaining five rows in Table 1 present our explanatory variables. District magnitude (DM) equals the number of seats in the municipal council. This varies from 7 to 55 seats, with an average of almost 22. We thus extend the work of Vatter (2003 ), Lago Penas (2004 ) and Vander Weyden (2004 by testing for an interaction effect in districts of moderately large size. Income inequality (INC) measures the diversity in income levels in the population. This is included based on Sørensen's (2003: 14-15) argument that 'income disparities widen [the] political space and open up for additional political parties' (see also Powell, 1982) . It is defined as the interquartile difference divided by median income: ([Q3 -Q1] / Median), with Q3 and Q1 referring to the third and first quartile, respectively. Higher values point to a larger income dispersion in the municipality. Nationality (NAT) points to the make-up of the population along the lines of the individuals' nationalities (a proxy for ethnic heterogeneity). It is defined as the 'effective' number of groups:
with n = 22 (relating to the 22 most frequently occurring nationalities in Belgium) and p i is the share of the population having nationality i. The cutoff at 22 nationalities is determined by the specific nature of the dataset, as the National Institute for Statistics (NIS/INS) provides data 'only' on the 22 most important nationalities for the period under study. Higher values point to more heterogeneous municipalities. Though the share of the population of non-Belgian nationality is limited in most municipalities (3.6 percent on average), the presence of non-natives nonetheless has important political consequences. Indeed, a recent study by Coffé et al. (2006) shows that the electoral success of the extreme right-wing party Vlaams Blok is significantly fostered by a larger presence of (mainly) Turkish and Magrebian citizens. Moreover, and important for our purposes, the pronounced presence of non-natives in a given municipality has a significantly positive effect on the probability that this party presents a list in this municipality. Next, the number of pre-1977 communities that make up the present municipality (AMAL) is representative of the large-scale municipal amalgamation operation in Belgium in 1976. As a consequence of this operation, most current 'municipalities' are composed of several pre-1977 'communities' (ranging from 1 to 30). Inhabitants of the various pre-1977 communities may still identify with this initial community and thereby differ from the other inhabitants of the new municipality. Moreover, each of these communities might well wish to have its weight carried politically and establish political parties to obtain this end. A similar 'identification' argument is employed in Lago Penas (2004: 33) to measure social heterogeneity as 'the intensity of the regional cleavage in each [Spanish] Autonomous Community'. Hence, we included the number of pre-1977 communities that make up the present municipality as an indicator of sociological heterogeneity (cf. Ashworth et al., 2002) .
Finally, in line with Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) , we also consider linguistic heterogeneity in the model. Specifically, the explicitly bilingual status of the Brussels Region (in contrast to the unilingual status of Flanders and Wallonia) may induce language-related political divergences between Dutch-speaking and French-speaking inhabitants in the 19 Brussels' municipalities (see, for example, Buelens and Deschouwer, 1997) . Because of lack of data on the relative number of Dutch-speaking and French-speaking citizens in Belgian municipalities, we capture the existence of significant linguistic differences in the Brussels' population by including a dummy variable (BRU) equal to 1 for the 19 Brussels' municipalities, 0 otherwise.
Functional Form and Unit of Analysis
The specification of our functional form derives from the route set out by Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) and follows much of the previous literature. Specifically, Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) argue that there are two possibilities to consider with respect to the relation between the two main independent variables: electoral laws (that is, district magnitude) and population heterogeneity. One approach is in assuming that population heterogeneity and electoral laws have independent effects on the number of parties. This method is taken in much of the previous literature where one of both effects was usually 'ignored' (or de facto relegated to the model's error term). The second approach is to assume that 'heterogeneity's impact is mediated by electoral structure -or, equivalently, that the operation of electoral structure depends on fixed social conditions' (Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994: 110) . These two options lead to three possible functional forms of the model.
Assuming independence between population heterogeneity and electoral laws leads to an additive model (cf. Powell, 1982 As with the functional form, there are a number of ways in which one can handle the data in the empirical analysis. These include Rae's (1967) election-by-election approach and Lijphart's (1990) electoral system approach. The former takes the election as unit of analysis and interprets each election result as a separate observation. The latter takes the electoral system (or regime) as the unit of analysis based on the argument that 'elections under the same rules are not really independent cases but merely repeated operations of the same electoral system' (Lijphart, 1990: 482) . Hence, the variables of interest are averaged over all elections within the regime to create one single observation per regime. Each of these points of view, however, has its advantages and drawbacks (for a critical assessment, see Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 1994: 101-3) . Following the examples set by Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) and Vander Weyden (2004), we bring forward the results from employing both Rae's and Lijphart's methods of dealing with the data. This allows us to see whether our results are affected by the way in which we handle the data (a standard robustness check).
Empirical Results
The results using Lijphart's approach are reported in Table 2 . The dependent variable is the simple count of the number of parties that obtained at least one vote in the election (averaged over the four elections in the sample).
In column (1), we see that this is significantly positively related to the district magnitude. A larger number of seats in the municipal council is associated with a broader choice for the electorate, as expected. In column (2), it is shown that all four heterogeneity measures are significantly positively related to the number of parties in the election, in line with theoretical predictions. Once we control for the influence of district magnitude in column (3), only our proxy for linguistic heterogeneity remains statistically significant. This indicates that most of the effect of the heterogeneity variables is taken up by the district magnitude and that these variables thus have only minor independent effects on the level of party system fragmentation.
The tests of the hypothesis that population heterogeneity and district magnitude are interactive are shown in columns (4) and (5). Before we discuss these results, a word of caution is in order. The inclusion of the interaction variables may obscure the interpretation of the estimated coefficients because of a high degree of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables. Indeed, if there is a high degree of multicollinearity between two variables (say, X and Y) and their interaction (XY), 'the XY term (. . .) embraces much of the X and Y effects, so [their coefficients] are likely to give a false impression of the trend in [the dependent variable] with change in X and Y' (Cronbach, 1987: 416) . Centring the explanatory variables of the model prior to forming the multiplicative term, as recommended by Cronbach (1987) and Jaccard et al. (1990) , addresses this multicollinearity problem. In line with Vander Weyden (2004), we use this transformation to reach the results reported in column (5). 9 Three of the four interaction terms are statistically significant and have the predicted sign. After controlling for possible independent effects of district magnitude and heterogeneity, all four interaction terms become significant at least at the 10 percent level. It can readily be seen that the model in column (5) provides the highest overall fit. This model -which corresponds with equation (3) in the previous section -explains more than 70 percent of the variation in the number of parties over the Belgian municipalities. Furthermore, the F-test at the foot of Table 2 shows that the interaction effects significantly add to the explanatory power of the model (p < 0.01). This implies that the influence of socio-economic heterogeneity on the number of electoral parties is significantly affected by the district magnitude, or, equivalently, that the effect of the electoral system variable is dependent upon the social diversity in the municipality. Our findings demonstrate that -in contrast to Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) -the interactive model outperforms the additive model even in a situation with multimember districts. As our results are obtained from districts with moderately large numbers of members, this strengthens the conclusion reached by Vander Weyden (2004) that the interactive model can be generalized to multi-member districts. Note, moreover, that the results from the latter study were obtained from a very different setting (Romanian senatorial elections). This suggests that the results are not dependent on the exact characteristics of the electoral system, strengthening the conclusions from a comparative point of view. 10 The next step is to see whether our results are robust to the use of Lijphart's (1990) approach to the data, rather than Rae's (1967) electionby-election approach. This is analysed in Table 3 . We report the results from the same set of regressions, except that we now regard each election as a separate observation. The results are much in line with those in Table 2 . The explanatory value of the model is slightly lower (57 percent versus 71 percent), but the main findings hold up. The interaction effect significantly adds to the explanatory power of the model (p < 0.01). Hence, our results are not affected by using either Lijphart's (1990) or Rae's (1967) method of dealing with the data.
Finally, to check the robustness of our results to the operationalization of the dependent variable, we re-estimated the model using the 'effective' 11.14*** number of parties. To save space, these results are only reported in the Appendix. Suffice it to say that the conclusions of our analysis are unaffected by this alternative operationalization of the dependent variable. That is, the interactive terms still (jointly) add explanatory power to the model (though the effect is less pervasive in this case; p < 0.05).
Conclusions
Recently, it has been argued, and empirically shown, that in explaining the shape of the party system one should take into account the interaction effect between population heterogeneity and electoral laws. Three important caveats might cast some doubt on this conclusion. Firstly, Ordeshook and Shvetsova (1994) indicate that the interaction effect only adds to the explanatory power of the model due to the inclusion of single-member district states. Secondly, the district magnitude is likely to be an endogenous variable in cross-country studies. Finally, averaging the key variables over the various districts to obtain one observation per country is not ideal. Rather, one should 'use constituency-level electoral returns and constituency-level indicators of social diversity' (Amorim-Neto and Cox, 1997: 168) . This article addresses these issues with Belgian municipality-level data from municipal elections over the period 1982-2000. We have included four measures of socio-economic diversity and tested for independent and interaction effects with electoral laws (i.e. district magnitude). The main conclusion is that even in a sample consisting only of moderately large multimember districts the interaction effects significantly add to the explanatory power of the model. This conclusion is not affected by our handling of the data or the exact operationalization of the dependent variable. The interpretation is that the influence of socio-economic heterogeneity on the number of electoral parties is significantly affected by the district magnitude, and vice versa. Further research should investigate whether this difference from Ordeshook and Shvetsova's (1994) finding is explained by the use of constituency-level data (e.g. by testing the model with national election results at the district level, as in Vander Weyden, 2004).
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1 Apparently, Duverger (1954: 205 , emphasis in original) was aware of the role of social diversity when he notes 'the most decisive influences [on the multiplication of parties] are (. . .) ideologies and particularly the socio-economic structure'. 2 Earlier, using a dataset covering 84 elections in 27 countries, Powell (1982) had already shown that the effective number of parliamentary parties is significantly related to measures for ethnic, economic and religious heterogeneity, even after controlling for the effect of non-majoritarian electoral laws. This indicates that both sets of variables have separate, independent effects. Powell (1982) , however, only estimates an additive model and does not include interaction effects between the variables. 3 Note that these studies do not look at single-member and multi-member district states separately. Hence, we cannot judge this part of Ordeshook and Shvetsova's (1994) findings in the extended dataset. 4 The 'effective threshold' is the share of votes minimally needed by a party to obtain a seat in the district. It represents a combination of the district magnitude and the height of legal thresholds (Lijphart, 1994) . 5 Herstappe and Grace-Hollogne are removed from the dataset as neither of these municipalities organized municipal elections in 1982. 6 As the district magnitude is determined by the municipality's population size, it could be related to socio-economic heterogeneity if larger municipalities are more heterogeneous. Though these correlations are small (r < 0.37), not controlling for heterogeneity may bias the estimation results. 7 Note that a significant number of politicians in Belgium hold office simultaneously at the federal and local level. As a consequence, one might argue that these politicians have the possibility to influence federal law-making (and thereby local district magnitudes). Nonetheless, each individual politician at the federal level has only very limited influence on policy. Moreover, the wishes of local officials from 589 Belgian municipalities with respect to the 'optimal' arrangement for district magnitudes are very likely to be conflicting (not only between municipalities, but also between different parties within the same municipality). Hence, and given that DM is a function only of population size, it appears very unlikely that the influence of local politicians at the federal level (if at all strong enough to sway federal law-making) will affect district magnitudes at the municipal level in any particular direction. In fact, federal legislation with respect to the municipal DM has remained essentially unchanged since its inception in 1836. 8 The 'effective' number of parties is calculated as:
where n is the actual number of parties in the election and p i equals the vote share that party i obtains (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) . 9 This transformation has no effect on the coefficients of the interaction terms, nor on the conclusion with respect to their statistical significance! In other words, 'the F-test on the change [in the model's explanatory value] is not biased by multicollinearity' (Cronbach, 1987: 416) . However, it does entail that using the noncentred data presented in Table 1 yields incorrect inferences with respect to the value of NoP for column (5). Use should be made of the centred data series. 10 As mentioned, Vatter (2003) and Lago Penas (2004) analyse large district magnitudes. Both find significant interaction effects between socio-economic heterogeneity and the effective threshold -in line with our findings. Unfortunately, however, neither analyses whether the interaction effects significantly add to the explanatory power of a model already including the independent effects from heterogeneity and the effective threshold.
